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On the Peculiar Relevance of a Fundamental Dilemma of 
Minimum-Wage Regulation in Post-Socialism –  
Apropos of an International Investigation 
 
István Gábor R.   
Abstract 
 
To the extent minimum-wage regulation is effective in fighting against excessive earnings 
handicaps of those at the bottom of earnings distribution, it may have the side-effect of 
worsening their employment prospects. A demand-and-supply interpretation of data on the 
relative employment rate and earnings position of the least educated in the EU27 suggests 
that the resulting dilemma might be particularly relevant for minimum-wage policies in post-
socialist countries.  
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This short essay was prepared and presented as a contribution to the conclusive panel of the 
Conference on „Minimum wage systems and changing industrial relations in Europe” 
(Brussel, September 23-24, 2010), organized by Manchester Business School in cooperation 
with the European Commission. For summaries of country case-studies (on Croatia, 
Germany, Hungary, Spain and the UK) and of their comparative evaluation that were 
discussed there, see: 
http://www.mbs.ac.uk/ research/europeanemployment/projects/minimum-wage.aspx. 
The author owes thanks to Zsombor Cseres-Gergely, János Köllő and David Stark for their 
empathic reading and inspiring comments.  
 
A minimálbér-szabályozás alapdilemmájának különös 
jelentőségéről a posztszocializmusban –  
egy nemzetközi vizsgálat apropóján 






A minimálbér-szabályozás, amennyiben eredményes a kereseteloszlás alján lévők túlzott 
kereseti hátránya elleni küzdelemben, mellékhatásként foglalkoztatási kilátásaik romlását 
idézheti elő. A legkevésbé iskolázottak viszonylagos foglalkoztatási rátájára és kereseti 
pozíciójára vonatkozó EU27-adatok kereslet-kínálati értelmezése azt sugallja, hogy az ebből 
fakadó dilemma különös jelentőségű lehet a poszt-szocialista régió országainak minimálbér-
politikája számára. 
 
Tárgyszavak: minimálbér, keresetszóródás, munkaerő-kereslet és -kínálat,  
bér- és foglalkoztatási diszkrimináció 
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1. THE DILEMMA 
Minimum-wage regulation is a notoriously  controversial issue among economists. So much 
so that about any pro invites a con, with periodic shifts in emphasis. 
Were one professing, for instance, that minimum-wage regulation may serve well as a 
helping hand for those who are at the lower tail-end of the earnings distribution for lack of 
bargaining strength, someone else would readily bring up some market-distortion kind of 
counter-argument. Say, that minimum-wage regulation, by hurting nonunion cost and price 
competition to union firms, tends to strengthen even further the excessive bargaining power 
of those employed at union firms. 
Advocates of minimum-wage regulation as a policy tool in fighting against poverty would 
meet particularly vehement opposition. It is far too blunt an instrument, someone would 
immediately riposte, pointing to the high proportion of those at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution who are by no means poor. If still deployed, the riposte would go on, it may 
backfire (as it clearly did in Hungary, as shown by findings, reported by Köllő (2010), of 
studies of the impacts of the 2001-2002 minimum wage hike): it may worsen the chance of 
entering into and/or remaining in gainful employment for exactly those who are meant to be 
helped.  
How far is this latter sort of counter-argument, and the dilemma of minimum-wage 
regulation policy it implies, well-founded is not the issue I am going to discuss. What I want 
to demonstrate is that, to the extent there is any truth in it – and few would doubt that there 
is some –, it must be particularly relevant for post-socialist countries, including my home 
country (Hungary). 
Were I right in that, an obvious corollary would be that lessons drawn from the 
experience of minimum-wage regulation in mature capitalist countries may not 
automatically/invariably apply to their post-socialist counterparts. 
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2. THE APPROACH 
I was lucky enough to be an invited fellow at Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced 
Study when, in late 1994, Nobel Laureate Robert Solow delivered a lecture there on how 
simple tools of demand-and-supply analysis could help explain the tendency of increasing 
earnings inequalities, as measured by the proportion of low-earners (earning below 2/3 of 
median) and various ratios of earnings deciles, that had been observed in the United States 
fr o m  197 5  t o  198 9.  M y  c o n t r ibu t io n  w il l ,  too, be based on a demand-and-supply kind of 
interpretation of similar indicators. 
At the same time, instead of trend-like evolution that may or may not be common to 
several countries, my contribution will address apparent distinctness of post-socialist vs. 
m a t u r e  c a p i t a l i s t  m e m b e r - c o u n t r i e s  o f  E U 2 7 ,  a s  i s  a t t e s t e d  b y  f i g u r e s  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  
EUROSTAT employment data and OECD earnings data for the year 2006.  
Furthermore, my exposition will mirror-image Solow’s in that, while he started out from 
data on earnings dispersion, and turned to data on unequal chances of employment only as a 
second step, I will follow the opposite route. The reason for this is purely pragmatic. It is 
motivated by today’s convention of setting goals in terms of employment opportunities rather 
than of earnings dispersion, at domestic as well as international forums. 
 
3. THE FACTS 
As is immediately apparent from the inspection of Figure 1, post-socialist member-countries 
of EU27 consistently lag behind the mature capitalist group with respect to the ratio of the 
employment rate of the least educated – those with lower secondary education or less – to 
the rate of employment of those with upper secondary education. Ranked according to this 
ratio, post-socialist countries, with no exception, are placed as file-closers. 
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  *Member-countries in alphabetical order (with their abbreviations in brackets): 
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark 
(DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary 
(HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxemburg (LU), Malta 
(MT), Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), 
Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES) Sweden (SE), United Kingdom (UK). 
Sources of data: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home  
 
In seeking to identify the origin of their lagging behind in a supply-and-demand 
framework, one might hope to get some clue from ranking the same countries according to 
their analogously-defined relative unemployment rates, as is illustrated by Figure 2. This 
additional ranking, however, is of not much guidance. 
 
Sources of data: see at Figure 1. 
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True, it does not yield nearly as unambiguously distinct, complementary patterns of 
positions of the respective country-groups as did our previous ranking. Nevertheless, it does 
not follow that supply-side factors are to be blamed in the first place. 
To wit, supply and demand are – unlike our ratios of relative (un)employment rates – not 
scalars, simply measurable as (derivatives of) physical quantities on a one-dimensional scale. 
They are, instead, conventionally conceived as sets of vectors of some kind of physical 
quantities and corresponding prices, and, therefore, they can only be illustrated in a 
meaningful way in a two-dimensional, price-quantity space. 
In Figure 3, accordingly, relative employment rate of the least educated of each country is 
plotted against some tightly correlated (imperfect) measures of the size of the least-
educated/more-educated earnings gap – representing reasonable alternative approximations 
of the price ratio of least educated/more educated labor –, which, in turn, are, as a matter of 
fact, strongly influenced by the level of the minimum wage (as is demonstrated by Grimshaw 
[2010] in his comparative report, where a negative cross-country relationship, with R2=0.59, 




Sources of data: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home 
for employment  
and 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx  





Interpreting the resulted plots in supply-and-demand notions, reasoning may go like this: 
To the extent consistently lower relative employment rates of the least educated in the post-
socialist region were due to lower relative supply of labor among the least educated 
population of working age (which could result from, e.g., generous income support for the 
low-income non-employed), better earnings positions of the low-educated, and narrower 
earnings differentials thereby, should simultaneously be observed there – just the contrary to 
what Figure 3 attests. 
What we see is that under post-socialist conditions the least educated are doubly 
disadvantaged in the labour market as compared to their peers in the mature capitalist world: 
they are hit by both consistently lower rates of employment and lower relative earnings – an 
unambiguous syndrome of lower relative demand for their labor. 
 
4. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
What aspects of post-socialist capitalism should be blamed for this lower relative demand? It 
is beyond me to present the answer. But generalizing from findings of János Köllő’s studies of 
the Hungarian case, the following three aspects of post-socialist evolution come to mind as 
the most obvious immediate causes: (1) an exaggeratedly fast rate of education-biased 
technological development, relative to the evolution of educational composition of the 
working-age population; (2) widening gap between the least educated and the more educated 
in marketable competencies and skills; and/or (3) a relative abundance of formally skilled 
labor with obsolete skills at the initial stage of post-socialist transition, with a resulting 
marked inflow of formally skilled labour into elementary occupations, which gave rise to a 
tendency of hiring over-qualified job applicants for such occupations. 
More relevant to the main thrust of my contribution than getting deeper into the causes is 
to complete the list of consequences. In addition to the lower relative rates of employment, 
coupled with lower relative earnings, of the least schooled, one more twin consequence needs 
to be spelled out. Namely, that lower relative demand for this category of labor provides a 
fertile ground for the proliferation of discrimination, be it prejudice-induced or statistical, 
while biasing its form of manifestation from wage discrimination as a relatively innocuous 








Let us take one more look at our upper diagram in Figure 3 – or, better, at its variant in 
Figure 4, where data points of the two groups of countries are put in separate graphs, and 
regression lines, conceived as representations of some kind of country-group level quasi-
demand functions, are fitted to the data points of the respective groups.  
From among our three measures of earnings dispersion only data on the D1/D5 ratio are 
exploited here, for the obvious reason of this indicator being most closely related to the 
earnings ratio of those with lower secondary education or less to those with upper secondary 
education. (Nothing qualitatively different would have emerged from the other two proxies, 
anyway.) Besides, Germany, for not being either mature capitalist or post-socialist in its 
entirety, is dropped, and so is Slovenia as an outlier according to several more economic 
indicators than just the ones of our interest here. Country markings are omitted, for better 
visual transparency. 
The Figure speaks for itself. The seemingly inferior (i.e. closer-to-the-origin) position of 
the post-socialist quasi-demand curve, while it implies more acute need for minimum-wage 
regulation, given the more disadvantaged earnings position of the least educated, also implies 
more acute danger of its employment kickback, given their lower relative rate of employment. 
Under the conditions of post-socialism, moreover, relative earnings and employment of the 
least educated are seemingly much more tightly correlated (cf. the respective values of R-
squared in the Figure), i.e., inevitability of painful trade-offs must be far more obvious. 
Accordingly, considerably more stringent restraint is warranted in improving the earnings 
position of the lowest paid via minimum-wage regulation. 
Similarly more conflict-loaded in the post-socialist region must be the impact of 
minimum-wage regulation on discrimination. Greater earnings handicaps, arising from the 
generally wider dispersion of earnings, of those from among the lowest schooled who are 
discriminated against is a telling argument for the deployment of minimum-wage regulation. 
No less telling is, on the other hand, the counter-argument which warns that, to the extent 
minimum-wage regulation does in effect reduce wage discrimination, it may induce higher 
incidence of employment discrimination: the creaming off of workers in elementary 
occupations who either belong to more favored groups or are over-qualified for the jobs – 
employers’ practices that hurt the least educated the most. For this reason, again, more 




Sources of data: see at Figure 3. 
 
 
To sum up, under the conditions of post-socialist capitalism, as it stands, systematically 
lower relative demand for the least educated category of labour does, indeed, seem to make 
the fundamental dilemma of minimum-wage regulation distinctly more conflict-loaded and, 
thus, particularly relevant – with differential impacts on the evolution of post-socialist 
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